INTRODUCTION
The New York Clearing House developed several tools that aided member banks in dealing with panics and runs on deposits.
1 One particularly central bank-like tool was the provision of clearing house loan certificates, which were IOUs backed by collateral and used by banks in place of specie and legal tender to settle accounts between banks during the check clearing process at the New York Clearing House. 2 As a result, clearing house loan certificates effectively freed up cash to pay depositors, buy up loans, facilitate gold imports, and preserve liquidity in the payments system.
Most previous research on the issuance of clearing house loan certificates during the National Banking Era relies on aggregate measures of their use in New York and on the informative analysis of Cannon (1910) . Relying on Cannon's description and on aggregated measures of clearing house loan certificates alone suggests that the Clearing House banks engaged in a united approach to fight panics during the National Banking Era. Our analysis based on bank-level data indicates that was likely not the case.
The big New York City national banks held the largest volume of cash reserves in the banking system and were the lynchpin of the reserves system during the National Banking Era.
The pyramid of reserves and correspondent banking funneled reserves to the big New York City banks, which were also able to add liquidity to the financial market in the United States, as James Cannon optimistically anticipated in the quote above. The New York Clearing House would allow illiquid member banks to borrow clearing house loan certificates thereby providing liquidity to the banks that needed it. The entire clearing house membership would honor the clearing house loan certificates as (a temporary) final payment. But the larger New York City national banks, during the National Banking Era, could also affect liquidity indirectly and thereby aid illiquid banks by borrowing clearing house loan certificates, substituting them temporarily as clearing balances, thereby releasing cash from its clearing balances to the banking system in New York. In this way, the large, New York City national bank would be providing liquidity with a conscious appreciation for improving market liquidity, a positive externality. Although this conventional story is implicit in Cannon (1910) , it is unclear whether incentives were sufficient to encourage the large, NYC banks to borrow in this way.
The central banking powers of the private clearing house system in the United States were limited. For example, the issues of clearing house loan certificates were imperfect substitutes for cash (they could not pass as hand to hand currency). One frequent criticism of clearing house loan certificate issues in New York City is that volume of issuance was perceived as too small to make a big difference in financial market liquidity during a panic and we agree. That observation likely arose from the passive method of issuance --banks had to borrow them and post adequate collateral against them. Further, the New York Clearing House was not a separate financial entity -it was unable to issue its own liabilities as central banks could. Hence, the New York Clearing House was unable to conduct "open market operations" and offer the financial market cash. Given such limitations to its power, it should not be surprising that the New York
Clearing House was incapable of effectively alleviating panics during this period. Yet the perspective of Cannon still permeates the analysis of the period and conveys a sense of a united clearing house membership engaged in a coordinated effort to forestall the panic. While we find some evidence consistent with this conventional view, we also find much that is not.
We have created a new data set of bank-level observations from the daily minutes of the New York Clearing House Loan Committee for the panics 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907. These data indicate the volume of the clearing house loan certificates requested, the bank identity, the exact date of the issues, and the date of cancellation of the certificates. The bank-level data on clearing house loan certificates contributes to our understanding of the behavior of individual banks during the panic. This in turn helps clarify the overall performance of the New
York Clearing House as a private lender of last resort.
This paper focuses on the borrowing behavior of the big New York City national banks as well as that of the biggest borrowers of clearing house loan certificates in each panic. The bank level data indicate great variation in the responses of individual New York banks to each panic. We find no explicit evidence of pre-conceived effort from the New York Clearing House in providing liquidity to the banking system. Depending on the panic instance, some large banks borrowed substantially, other large banks not at all. While we do not yet know the reasons why particular banks issued loan certificates and others did not, we suspect that bank specific liquidity needs rather than concerns about the general stability of the banking system explains the changing participation in loan certificate issues. In summary, we find little evidence to indicate coordination of loan certificate issues by the New York Clearing House and its members.
II CENTRAL BANK-LIKE TOOLS AND SOME HISTORY
Interior banks deposited cash in New York City national banks and those deposits qualified as reserves meeting reserve requirements established by the National Bank Acts. Chicago and St. Louis had become central reserve cities in 1887, reducing the proportion of bankers' balances in New York. Nevertheless, New York was still the key central reserve city (Sprague 1910, p. 125 ) and the reserves held in New York City also had become increasingly concentrated at the big banks. Because the big New York national banks sat at the top of the pyramid of reserves, their ability to rearrange reserves combined with the supervisory capabilities of the New York Clearing House over its members presented them with nascent central bank powers.
A. Clearing House Loan Certificates.
The borrowing of clearing house loan certificates was a mechanism to allocate temporary liquidity to member banks, and active participation in honoring loan certificates as final payment was an obligation New York Clearing House members. Therefore, by honoring the payment by clearing house loan certificate, the accepting bank was effectively lending to the borrowing bank.
Further the membership agreed in advance to abide by their loss-sharing rules, which specifically described how the membership would share losses from clearing house certificates of banks that failed to repay them. New York Clearing House member banks were exposed to losses arising from unpaid clearing house loan certificates, so their private equity capital was placed at risk by any issuance of clearing house loan certificates.
3
The New York Clearing House was the issuer of clearing house loan certificates for the borrowing member banks. Member banks would borrow them after having put up collateral suitable to the Clearing House Loan Committee. Usually the clearing house loan certificates 3 Losses on clearing house loan certificate issues to New York Clearing House members were shared among the membership and assessments to cover loss amounts would be made relative to member bank capital.
would be issued at 75 percent of the value of the pledged collateral, although it could be higher or lower. Member banks were obliged to accept clearing house loan certificates in lieu of cash during settlement, although the accepting bank would earn six percent interest paid by the bank that borrowed them. The New York Clearing House kept track of interest payments. While the certificates bore the name of the borrower, the membership of the New York Clearing House nevertheless guaranteed them and the guarantee was an important support to the required acceptance for payment.
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Clearing house loan certificates were not a net increase in cash reserves. Rather, the loan certificates were a temporary substitute for specie or legal tender used to settle final payment balances at the New York Clearing House among the member banks. 5 On the balance sheet, the clearing house loan certificate represents an asset for the receiving bank available for payment and as a liability in the form of a loan from the New York Clearing House membership, or more accurately, from each member bank that accepted them as final payment. The liability in the form of clearing house loan certificates could also be transferred from one bank to another at par during settlement. We emphasize that clearing house loan certificates were a transferable liability and not a single loan between two specific banks. Rather, as transferable liability, the clearing house loan certificate implicitly involved a loan from the holding bank to the borrowing bank. Because they could not circulate outside of the Clearing House and be issued to the public, clearing house loan certificates were an imperfect (and inferior) substitute for legal tender. We seek evidence of coordinated effort on the part of the clearing house member banks to fight a panic. We expect unified or coordinated behavior by the clearing house banks to provide liquidity during a panic, generously if at a high rate of interest if it were following Bagehot's advice. We also expect to see the New York Clearing House members intentionally taking on central bank functions. Note that these are ideal behaviors of a central bank.
Reserve pooling, as in the Panic of 1873, might be such an action from a system-focused entity like New York Clearing House. One can think of reserve pooling as maximizing the value of liquidity provision at the margin and thereby avoiding inefficiencies like reserve hoarding by individual banks. That said, the absence of reserve pooling in the responses to panic conditions in 1884 through 1907 suggests that the New York Clearing House banks with sufficient reserves were unwilling to share them without compensation. In contrast, clearing house loan certificates has an implicit compensation scheme distinguishing it from reserve pooling.
Banks requesting clearing house loan certificates were trying to increase their liquidity, and the creditor banks accepting them were agreeing to share the risk of default if a member could not redeem their loan certificates. Borrowing loan certificates was at the discretion of the individual bank, and although member banks had to accept loan certificates as payment, there was no provision to compel member banks to borrow them in the first place. In a counterfactual world of an active lender of last resort, we would expect some obligation on the part of all member banks to issue them, and that is the sense one gets from reading Cannon (1910, page 79) .
Others regard it (requesting clearing house loan certificates) as in no way prejudicial to their interests, but rather as a patriotic movement in which all the banks should engage, both for the purpose of assisting their fellow-members and for the welfare of the community as a whole. The members of the New York Clearing House Association especially have distinguished themselves in this regard. Up to 1907, when only about 60 per cent of the members found it necessary to take out certificates, it has been the almost universal rule for all the members to take loan certificates whenever the occasion demanded such action on the part of any of the banks, and this, too, without regard to how strong they may have been or how easily they might have gotten on without using them.
Our evidence does not support this characterization.
Coordinated issues of clearing house loan certificates would display volumes in proportion to each bank's assets, reserves, bank clearings or net banker balances, which would require orchestration and/or coercion by the clearing house. Banks refusing to issue loan certificates might find themselves fined or expelled from the clearing house. This counterfactual assumes only the tools and supervisory authority that the New York Clearing House actually had at the time to establish a baseline for evaluating its observed behavior relative to that of a central bank.
In short, could the New York Clearing House have reasonably altered its behavior to be more like a lender of last resort if the evidence indicates that its actual behavior had fallen short?
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B. Aggregate Measures
Before looking at bank level information, we present aggregate information for all New
York Clearing House member banks in New York. Table 1 We examine the issuance of clearing house loan certificates relative to key balance sheet items across the five panics in Charts 1 and 2. Chart 1 presents the ratios of loan certificates to cash reserves and to net due tos. Chart 2 presents the ratios of clearing house loan certificates to net deposits and to total assets. The ratios indicate some important differences in the balance sheet conditions of the New York City banks in certain crisis periods. However, the differences Looking at the clearing house loan certificates to net due tos ratio, we note that the ratio is nearly 30 percent higher in both 1873 and 1907 relative to the other panics. The subsequent drains on deposits --perhaps related to the level of net due tos --likely determined the degree of clearing house loan certificate issuance. The aggregate figures indicate that the New York Clearing House banks were responding to the severity of panics, at least as viewed from New York.
Chart 1 illustrates how clearing house loan certificates were used most intensely to increase liquidity during panics that most directly affected the New York Clearing House banks (1873, 1907 , and 1893 to a lesser extent). Aggregate level data presents a benign view of the New York Clearing House's response to panics, providing liquidity in proportion to the severity of each panic, at least from the perspective of New York City.
C. Who Issued Loan Certificates --the Larger Panics: 1873, 1893 and 1907
Making comparisons across 1873 to 1907 is complicated by the fact that the ranks of the biggest banks changed. For example, the First National was rather small in 1873 as measured by volume of assets; by 1907 it was the fourth largest. National City Bank, James Stillman's bank in 1907, was only the seventeenth largest in 1873; it was largest in 1907. We examine the behavior of the six largest banks in each panic based on the volume of assets and then on the volume of loan certificates issued; these were the banks that had the most to lose if the financial markets shut down. We rank banks based on assets and total loan certificates issued because we presume that if Clearing House members behave like a lender of last resort, it will be most pronounced among the largest banks taking the lead during panics. We examine the big six banks in each panic, although there is no theoretical or structural reason for choosing the six largest banks. 12 Note also that the proportion of New York Clearing House member bank assets accounted for by the biggest six banks varies over time.
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We focus first on the largest panics --1873, 1893, and 1907-as each was unique in how New York was affected and how the Clearing House Banks reacted. Following Sprague (1910) and Wicker (2000) , we return to 1884 and 1890 as two examples of how the New York Clearing
House banks handled panics when their private interests were immediately threatened, but not as seriously as in the larger panics. Furthermore, we look only at the mix of banks, ranked by volu me of assets and loan certificates issued, participating in issuing loan certificates.
The Panic of 1873
12 In 1907 the Big Six were National City Bank, National Bank of Commerce, Hanover National Bank, National Park Bank, First National Bank, and Chase National Bank (Sprague 1910, p. 267) . This is the traditional definition of the Big Six. Myers (1931) also follows the convention of examining the six largest banks. In 1873 the six largest banks were the Fourth National Bank, the National Bank of Commerce, National Park Bank, the Bank of New York [never a big correspondent -more of a wholesale bank], the Metropolitan National Bank, and the Importers and Traders National Bank. 13 We could choose a threshold proportion of New York Clearing House bank member assets or deposits as the condition for the large players in New York City banking and we may pursue that route in future work. 
The Panic of 1893
The panic of 1893 started in the interior of the country and did not threaten the New York banks directly. The lack of an imminent threat to the liquidity of New York Clearing House banks is revealed in both Table 4 and Table 5 . Table 4 shows that the six largest banks borrowed only 27 percent of the loan certificates, which was about the same as their share of New York
Clearing House member capital and surplus (27 percent); the same banks combined accounted for about 30 percent of New York Clearing House bank loans.
As noted above, the borrowing reveals a potential for the larger banks to play the creditor role to borrowing banks. The biggest borrowers of loan certificates took out 42 percent and the bank that borrowed were relatively large, ranking from 3rd to 18 th on the basis of total assets.
The New York banks issued a larger total volume of loan certificates than in 1873 (and in 1884 and 1890). Mercantile National borrowed clearing house loan certificates in an amount over 20 percent of its total assets and in an amount that was over 125 percent of its capital and surplus, signaling that it faced a serious liquidity crunch. But the total amount of borrowing by Mercantile was not sufficient to threaten the solvency of the membership; the clearing house loan certif- 
The Panic of 1907
The Panic of 1907, while centered on the trust companies, still presented a grave threat to the New York Clearing House member banks. If the call loan market had frozen up and the stock market collapsed, the New York Clearing House member banks could have been dragged down with the trust companies. Five of the "Big Six" banks borrowed more loan certificates, collectively and individually, than they had in earlier panics (Tables 6 and 7 
Comparing 1893 and 1907
In the panics of 1893 and 1907 most of the same New York banks took out clearing house loan certificates. Although it is well known that the sources of the panics were quite dif- Wicker (2000) ). The panic-based withdrawals were focused on Metropolitan National Bank, which was rumored to have been caught in a large amount of fraudulent speculation in railroad stocks, ru-mors that were not confirmed by the Comptroller (Wicker 2000, p. 36-7) . One third of all loan certificates issued in 1884 were borrowed by Metropolitan National Bank (Table 9 ). Bank of New York borrowed clearing house loan certificates in an amount over 40 percent of the loans on its balance sheet. Six banks accounted for 89 percent of all loan certificates issued.
Metropolitan borrowed clearing house loan certificates to an amount that was nearly 70 percent of the loans on its balance sheet as of May 10, 1884. The amount verged on its limit for collateral at the New York Clearing House because clearing house loan certificates were issued at 75 percent of the market value of the assets offered as collateral. By allowing Metropolitan National Bank request an enormous volume of clearing house loan certificates, the member banks of the New York Clearing House were effectively lending to a bank that was suffering a run. Given that six banks borrowed the majority of the clearing house loan certificates, there was a lot of capacity for offering credit to these banks from the remainder of the New York Clearing House member banks. There was no widespread restriction of convertibility of deposits into cash suggesting that only one specific bank was struck with panic withdrawals. Metropolitan was voluntarily liquidated in November 1884 following extensive withdrawals through the summer.
The New York Clearing House required nearly two years to resolve the outstanding clearing house loan certificates with Metropolitan, indicating the unusual amount of the borrowing.
The success of the response to the financial distress of 1890 relies heavily upon the active Treasury intervention in the financial market earlier in August and September in amounts that dwarf the issues of clearing house loan certificates (see pages 387-399, Sprague 1910 and pages 44-45 in Wicker 2000) . That said, the issues of clearing house loan certificates in November 1890 were still pertinent for the NYC banks to avoid a more disruptive financial crisis.
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The pattern of loan certificates issued in 1890 indicates that the largest national banks did not participate heavily in issuing loan certificates; only two of the six issued any clearing house loan certificates at all (Table 10 ). In addition, in 1890, several state banks participated by requesting clearing house loan certificates, unlike in 1884 (Table 11 ). The most notable aspect for 1890 is that the largest borrowers of clearing house loan certificates practically borrowed an amount of temporary liquidity that was about the volume of their cash reserves. The figures provide strong indication of a severe liquidity crisis for these banks. Only in 1873 was a similar set of characteristics displayed.
E. Clearing House Loan Certificates and Liquidity Needs.
The ratio of loan certificates to reserves (or legal tender and specie) helps reveal the extent to which loan certificates were used to increase liquidity at banks facing large clearing debits and depositor withdrawals. In 1873 the ratio is in general much higher for the big banks than in Clearing House banks became extraordinarily low even after the imposition of suspension of convertibility. For the New York City banks, it was closer to reserve depletion than they would ever again experience during the National Banking Era. In 1884, 1890, and 1893 the ratio was lower, and fewer of the large national banks even participated in issuing loan certificates.
Specific banks also issued exceptionally large volumes of loan certificates. Metropolitan
Bank in 1884 is a prime example. Metropolitan had been linked to alleged speculation in railroad stocks and experienced a severe depositor run. The New York Clearing House authorized an issue $7 million of clearing house loan certificates to Metropolitan National Bank likely because it had significant correspondent deposits. This was by far the largest amount issued to any bank in 1884, amounting to over three times its reserves of legal tender and specie. The Bank of New York also borrowed a large volume of loan certificates, twice its reserves. While the Bank of New York was not in danger of failure, it apparently borrowed heavily owing to its prominent position in the correspondent banking system. State banks were also important borrowers of loan certificates in 1890, particularly Mechanics and Traders and the Bank of North America.
These two banks were aided directly by nine large New York banks under the supervision of J.P.
Morgan, but they also took out large volumes of loan certificates.
The ratio of loan certificates to reserves reveals clearly several things we already suspected. First, the big banks were more likely to take out loan certificates in general if the New York market was under threat, as in 1873 and 1907. It also identifies more closely banks that were in immediate need of reserves, like Bank of North America in 1873 and Metropolitan in 1884.
IV DISCUSSION
We suggest that issuing clearing house loan certificates could not be counted on to deliver reliable liquidity during many of the panics. The main weaknesses were structural. The flaws of clearing house loan certificates were: a) the liquidity provision mechanism was passive, relying on the demand from the borrowing banks and on the volume and quality of borrowing bank collateral, b) clearing house loan certificates were not a good substitute for base money liquidity because they were not allowed to pass as currency between non-clearing house banks (much less the public), and c) there was apparently no way for the New York Clearing House to offer liquidity to the market directly by compelling member banks to borrow loan certificates. They were designed to free up clearing balances and cover clearing debits and led to an increase net liquidity indirectly. That said they were better than nothing.
The operation of a private association of banks as the lender of last resort institution was also part of the complication. By using clearing house loan certificates as substitutes for cash reserves, the New York Clearing House member banks expose their equity capital to risk of losses during a panic. James Cannon (1910) hints that banks recognized the positive externality of providing for more liquidity to "other" banks when a given bank takes out CHLCs. Recall the quote above citing that banks would request CHLCs "for the purpose of assisting their fellow-members and for the welfare of the community as a whole." Still, it is possible that there was an imperfect understanding of CHLCs across banking institutions. If so, the perception that clearing house loan certificates were issued in insufficient amounts may arise because an insufficient amount of bankers thought it was valuable, hence missing the externality value of liquidity. Also, banks could request and borrow CHLCs and not circulate them, thereby not paying interest on them.
The only way CHLCs get circulated is if a bank uses them to settle accounts at the clearing house in lieu of legal tender or specie. Some estimates of the percentage that circulated hover between 60 to 75 percent. proportional participation of the big banks in most panics, the severity of the panics suggested that the aggregate liquidity provision through clearing house loan certificates was insufficient.
V CONCLUSIONS
The system had to rely on gold imports and suspension of convertibility rather than a deeper use of loan certificates. Whether the shortfall was a result of insufficient quantity borrowed/issued or that the temporary liquidity medium itself was too limited is a question left for future study. 
